<p>IIRC last year we talked about switching to a different method and just didn't get it together in time.</p>
<p>This sounds great to me, though I doocratically support the voting-stuff-makers doing it however they want.</p>
<p>If it was up to me we'd do it with a hacking skills triathalon ;) but I refuse to make a scoreboard because psychologists say scoring promotes competition...</p>
<p>R.</p>
<p><a href="http://mediumreality.com">mediumreality.com</a></p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Jan 14, 2012 12:15 AM, "Ben Kochie" <<a href="mailto:superq@gmail.com">superq@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Yes, Approval voting seems reasonable for the offices and number of<br>
candidates we have.<br>
<br>
On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 08:28, jim <<a href="mailto:jim@systemateka.com">jim@systemateka.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> +1<br>
><br>
> On Thu, 2012-01-12 at 23:54 -0800, Leif Ryge wrote:<br>
>> For our upcoming Board of Directors election, I propose that we use<br>
>> approval voting[1] instead of the Schulze[2] condorcet[3] method which<br>
>> we used previously.<br>
>><br>
>> Condorcet methods are designed to select the candidate most preferred<br>
>> by a majority of voters. Approval voting selects the candidate who is<br>
>> acceptable to the largest number of voters. I think the latter is more<br>
>> appropriate for Noisebridge.<br>
>><br>
>> Paraphrasing wikipedia:<br>
>> > The Schulze method is a voting system that selects a single winner<br>
>> > using votes that express preferences. The method can also be used to<br>
>> > create a sorted list of winners. It is a Condorcet method, which<br>
>> > means the following: if there is a candidate who is preferred over<br>
>> > every other candidate in pairwise comparisons, then this candidate<br>
>> > will be the winner when the Schulze method is applied.<br>
>><br>
>> > Approval voting is a single-winner voting system. The method can<br>
>> > also be used to create a sorted list of winners. Each voter may vote<br>
>> > for (or 'approve' of) as many of the candidates as the voter wishes.<br>
>> > The winner is the candidate receiving the most votes. Each voter may<br>
>> > vote for any combination of candidates and may give each candidate at<br>
>> > most one vote.<br>
>><br>
>> It is worth noting that neither method is really meant for electing<br>
>> multiple winners, but either can be modified for that purpose. With<br>
>> approval voting, the multi-winner method is fairly obvious since the<br>
>> candidates can simply be ranked by how many votes they received. With<br>
>> condorcet methods such as Schulze, after a single winner is selected,<br>
>> to select each additional winner the counting process must be repeated<br>
>> ignoring votes for the previous winner(s).<br>
>><br>
>> What are the downsides to approval voting? As far as I can tell (please<br>
>> correct me if I'm missing something!), they boil down to these two:<br>
>> 1) Sincere voters (those who honestly vote for every candidate who is<br>
>> acceptable to them) can help their more-preferred candidate lose to a<br>
>> less-preferred-but-acceptable candidate. (I think, in our case at least,<br>
>> that this is actually a feature.)<br>
>> 2) When strategic (insincere) voters' predictions of the outcome are<br>
>> incorrect, their strategy can fail. For example, imagine the USA were<br>
>> using approval voting in the 2004 presidential election. A voter who<br>
>> would prefer Dennis Kucinich over John Kerry (but would prefer either<br>
>> of them over George W. Bush) would logically cast votes of approval for<br>
>> both Kucinich and Kerry if they expected that only Bush and Kerry were<br>
>> "viable" candidates. However, if they mistakenly believed that Kerry<br>
>> and Kucinich were both viable and Bush was not, they might<br>
>> strategically withhold their vote for Kerry.<br>
>><br>
>> What is the downside to condorcet voting? Simply put, using a condorcet<br>
>> method, a candidate who is unacceptable to 49% of voters yet preferred<br>
>> by 51% will beat a candidate who is acceptable to 100% of the voters.<br>
>><br>
>> I hope that using approval voting (and encouraging sincere voting) we<br>
>> will have enough candidates with 100% approval to fill the board, and<br>
>> then we will have effectively consensed on an acceptable set of board<br>
>> members! If we have more than enough winning candidates, in lieu of a<br>
>> runoff election I suggest we could use a lottery and/or expand the size<br>
>> of the board.<br>
>><br>
>> I'll be bringing this up for discussion at this week's meeting, and<br>
>> hopefully we can get consensus about it at the following meeting.<br>
>><br>
>> ~leif<br>
>><br>
>> 1: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting" target="_blank">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting</a><br>
>> 2: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method" target="_blank">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method</a><br>
>> 3: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method" target="_blank">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method</a><br>
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