[Noisebridge-discuss] Secheduling a Cryptography Talk at Noisebridge on 4 August

[Peter Schwabe]

John Shutt <john.d.shutt at gmail.com> wrote:
> Yep, a short abstract would be good. Thanks!

Dear John, dear all,

Sorry for the late response, how about this one:


Title: Post-quantum crypto

Abstract: In 2012, Mark Ketchen, researcher at IBM, stated about large
          quantum computers that they are "within reach" and estimated
          a timespan of 10 to 15 years until such computers can be
          built. It is not clear if Ketchen is right with this estimate,
          it is not even clear if a large quantum computer will ever be
          built. However, what is clear is that such a computer will be
          able to break all asymmetric cryptography in wide use today.
          More specifically, it will break in polynomial time systems
          that are based on factoring (like RSA) and systems based on
          the discrete logarithm (like DSA, and Diffie-Hellman key
          exchange), including their elliptic-curve variants.
          There are asymmetric cryptographic systems that, as far as we
          know, are not broken by quantum computers, so called
          "post-quantum cryptography". It is obvious that once large
          quantum computers exist, the world will need to switch to such
          post-quantum schemes. However, users who are concerned about
          long-term security, have to switch to post-quantum schemes for
          confidentiality already now: an attacker who records and
          stores key exchanges today can go back in a decade or two and
          use a quantum computer to attack them. 
          In my talk I will give a brief overview of post-quantum crypto
          and then highlight what we can, and should, already do today
          to provide long-term security in cryptographic systems. In
          particular, I will present the "NewHope" key exchange, which
          is currently used in an experiment by Google and is one of the
          candidates to be considered for post-quantum key exchange in
          Tor.


Cheers,

Peter

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