[tor] Approaching ISPs

isis agora lovecruft isis at torproject.org
Mon Jan 30 06:54:49 UTC 2017


Patrick O'Doherty transcribed 8.7K bytes:
> I hadn't considered that, and it does make a lot of sense to keep this
> isolation for the purposes of dealing with 3rd parties and explaining
> the relationship between Noise{bridge,tor}.
> 
> On the subject of "other things the Tor network could use help with"
> I've seen requests for more meek bridges of suitable capacity
> (~150Mbps+).

If you decide to go this route, a couple notes:

We currently need:

 - Meek bridge backends (the actual Tor bridge which the Meek infrastructure
   connects to)

 - Meek CND backends (these are the CDN endpoints; a Tor client connects to
   this in order to make it look like it's just using
   Google/Microsoft/Amazon/etc services, and then this piece connects to the
   Meek bridge backend described above)

 - Other default PT bridges, which will be compiled into Tor Browser;
   specifically, obfs4 bridges

> *However* there is an open question and active debate as to
> how comfortable the community is with Exit operators also running large
> Bridge relays due to the potential to deanonymize users.

When running a Tor bridge, the daemon will warn that setting the MyFamily
option is not advised for bridges.  That information will definitely be
scrubbed later in the processing chain, once the bridge's descriptor gets to
metrics, but this *should* still make it to the client.  If not, this is a
bug, and regardless this is a perfect use-case and this warning has been
annoying me for years.  I'm happy to fix this, if Noisetor wants to run
bridges.

Best,
-- 
 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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