[tor] Adding another node

[Davidfine]

I'm not admin on noisetor, and I'd be willing to be part of a second group.
--D

On 8/28/13 8:15 AM, Ben Kochie wrote:
> Thanks Isis.
>
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 3:38 PM, isis <isis at torproject.org> wrote:
>> Ben Kochie transcribed 4.0K bytes:
>>> Sounds like something we could take over, but didn't we want to limit our
>>> impact on the network?
>>>
>>> Maybe we can find a non-overlapping crew for the 2nd node.
>> While "diversity of the Tor network" has been discussed frequently of late,
>> within the Tor Project (and also within the broader community) it is my
>> understanding that the current view is that having responsible, transparent,
>> and friendly organisations running families of exit relays is positive for the
>> network, in more ways than merely adding exit bandwidth capacity. People seem
>> more apt to trust the relays run by Noisebridge, CCC, and other allies.
>>
>> I would argue that trust is absolute imperative in a decentralised system (as
>> much as the Tor network could be considered decentralised), and that NoiseTor
>> running Amunet would be better than some other party running Amunet.
>>
>> That said, if the sysadmin work has grown to be too much...I understand.
> Ok, that's answers my question.  The sysadmin work is pretty minor.
>
>>> On Aug 27, 2013 8:22 PM, "Andy Isaacson" <adi at hexapodia.org> wrote:
>>>> The funders of Amunet have offered to donate to Noisetor if we are
>>>> willing to take over running the node.  It's a similar value to our
>>>> current exit01, approximately $800/mo for 500 Mbps of throughput, on a
>>>> rented colo server.
>>>>
>> Also, there are now opportunities which are soon going to be extended to
>> "friendly"/"allied" organisations which run exit nodes. One of the
>> deliverables for some Tor sponsor is to increase the overall bandwidth
>> capacity of the entire network by at least 3GB/s (roughly a 10% increase)
>> within the next few years, and an outside organisation, the folks at
>> TorServers.net, have offered to deal with distributing this money for us (we
>> really want as little to do with running the network as possible). NoiseTor is
>> very likely eligible for these extra funds, of which there is a set ammount to
>> be distributed per month, and relays run in countries with a lesser
>> probability of a Tor client exiting from are prioritised (and somewhat
>> incentivised through extra funding). It's not exactly determined what this
>> should look like yet, but the output from Compass [0] shows that a user's
>> chance of exiting in the USA is about 22%. Several countries have an exit
>> probability of 0%, even though they *do* have relays. I've attached the
>> current output of the following commands for reference:
>>
>> ∃!isisⒶwintermute:(master u=)~/code/torproject/compass ∴ ./compass.py  --by-country -t -1 > ~/`date +'%Y-%m-%d'`-compass.txt
>> ∃!isisⒶwintermute:(master u=)~/code/torproject/compass ∴ ./compass.py  --by-country -t -1 --json > ~/`date +'%Y-%m-%d'`-compass.json
>>
>> And though the factors for computing the incentivisation of lesser probability
>> countries are as-yet-undetermined, I did a bit of work on this recently, the
>> script is here [1], current output with the above compass files also
>> attached. (Mostly because I wanted to fuck around with multidimensional
>> mixed-typed arrays in numpy...) The winsorization function needs a bit of
>> love, if anyone knowledgable on robust statistics and Python wants to play
>> with it.
> This sounds like fun.
>
>>>> I think we should take this opportunity to double our capacity.
>>>>
>>>> Thoughts?
>> tl;dr: This is my very geeky way of saying, "Please, NoiseTor, it would be
>> awesome if you took Amunet. Also, there is likely additional no-strings
>> funding regardless of running Amunet or not. And ♥Ⓐ♥ Noisebridge ♥Ⓐ♥."
> I vote noisetor accept Amunet.
>
>> --
>>  ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
>> _________________________________________________________
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